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 American Philosophical Quarterly
 Volume 29, Number 3, July 1992
 THE POSSIBILITY OF CONCEPTUAL
 CLARITY IN PHILOSOPHY
 Michael A. Bishop
 A HE attempt to analyze and clarify con?
 cepts is a trademark of Western philosophy.
 And this is how it should be. Given the rela?
 tively non-empirical nature of the philosophi?
 cal endeavor, philosophers must be concerned
 with the state of their primary instruments?
 language and the concepts expressed by lan?
 guage. The aim of this paper is to make sense of
 a pattern of argumentation typically employed
 in the effort to clarify philosophically impor?
 tant concepts. The upshot will be that only by
 adopting a thoroughgoing naturalism will we
 have any real chance to achieve the goal of
 conceptual clarity in philosophy.
 I. COUNTEREXAMPLE PHILOSOPHY
 Counterexample philosophy is a distinc?
 tive pattern of argumentation philosophers
 since Plato have employed when attempting
 to hone their conceptual tools. It begins
 when someone proposes a classical account
 of a philosophically important concept. A
 classical account of a concept offers singly
 necessary and jointly sufficient conditions
 for the application of a term expressing that
 concept. Probably the best known of these is
 the traditional account of knowledge.
 (K) X is knowledge iff X is a justified true
 belief
 The list of philosophers who have advanced
 classical accounts of concepts would not only
 include many of the greatest figures in the his?
 tory of philosophy, but also many highly re?
 garded contemporary philosophers. Consider
 just a fraction of these: David Lewis on con?
 vention (1969) and on causation (1973), Alvin
 Goldman on knowledge (1967), H.P. Grice on
 meaning (1957), Carl Hempel on explanation
 (1948), Wesley Salmon on causation (1984),
 and Hilary Putnam on mental states (1967).
 The next stage of counterexample philoso?
 phy involves philosophical sharpshooters
 taking aim at the classical account of the
 concept by proposing counterexamples.
 While the paradigm is probably Gettier's
 (1963) counterexample to (K), counterex?
 amples have also been levelled against
 each of the classical accounts noted above:
 Tyler B?rge against Lewis' account of con?
 vention (1975), Jaegwon Kim against
 Lewis' account of causation (1973), Hilary
 Putnam against Goldman's account of
 knowledge (1983), Paul Ziff against
 Grice's account of meaning (1967), Sylvain
 Bromberger against Hempel's account of
 explanation (1966), Philip Kitcher against
 Salmon's account of causation (1989), and
 John Searle against Putnam's account of
 mental states (1980).
 The final stage of counterexample philos?
 ophy involves one of three potential re?
 sponses to an apparently successful
 counterexample. One might amend the ac?
 count so it no longer succumbs to the coun?
 terexample, at which point philosophical
 sharpshooters reset their sights on the re?
 vised account. Or one might admit defeat:
 no amount of tinkering will save the ac?
 count. Finally, one might bite the bullet by
 holding fast to the classical account even
 though many think the counterexample is
 successful. J. J. C. Smart's discussion of al?
 leged counterexamples to act utilitarianism
 is a classic case of bullet biting: "The fact
 that [utilitarianism] has consequences
 which conflict with some of our particular
 moral judgements need not be decisive
 against it.... I am not concerned with what
 our moral customs and institutions in fact
 are... I am concerned with a certain view
 about what they ought to be" (1973, p. 56).
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 Which of these responses is appropriate de?
 pends on the philosopher's aim in adducing
 the account. Counterexample philosophy
 has three potential aims.
 (1) Conceptual analysis: A serious and
 venerable psychological hypothesis holds
 that many concepts are made up of other
 concepts. For example, the concept bachelor
 might be constructed out of the concepts
 available unmarried man. If we adopt this
 psychological hypothesis, one might propose
 that the success condition on a classical ac?
 count is that the concept expressed by the
 term on one flank of the biconditional be
 constituted by the concepts expressed by the
 terms on the other flank of the biconditional.
 For instance, (K) is a successful instance of
 conceptual analysis just in case our concept
 knowledge is made up of the conjunction of
 our concepts justified true belief.
 (2) Conceptual explication: In order for an
 instance of conceptual explication to suc?
 ceed, the extensions of the target term and
 its classical account must be identical with
 respect to all clear instances and non-in?
 stances of the target term.1 On this view, (K)
 is a successful explication just in case any?
 thing that is a clear case of knowledge is also
 a clear case of justified true belief and anything
 that is a clear non-instance of knowledge is also
 a clear non-instance of justified true belief.
 How our concepts are psychologically repre?
 sented is irrelevant to this endeavor.
 Sections II and III of this paper will offer
 empirical reasons why conceptual analysis
 and explication cannot succeed. If this is
 right, how are we to understand the attempt
 by some very distinguished philosophers to
 give classical accounts of philosophically im?
 portant terms? Is it merely a mistake of a
 bygone era? Perhaps. But before we dispose
 of such a significant piece of philosophical
 heritage, we should consider the third poten?
 tial aim of counterexample philosophy.
 (3) Conceptual revision: So far we have
 considered conservative aims of counterex?
 ample philosophy?they set out to preserve
 something important about the target term.
 Conceptual revision does not set the preser?
 vation of the target term's intension or ex?
 tension as a condition for success. Finding a
 difference between the extensions of the re
 vision and the target term is, by itself, irrele?
 vant to the acceptability of the revision. But
 what makes one revision more successful
 than another? If there are no rules about
 this, if willy-nilly conceptual revision is the
 aim, then it seems a worthless and absurd proj?
 ect. Assuming the conservative endeavors
 (analysis and explication) are unlikely to suc?
 ceed, it is essential we respond to this challenge
 on pain of forfeiting counterexample philoso?
 phy as a tool for conceptual clarification.
 Section IV is a response to this challenge.
 One might argue that these options do not
 exhaust the potential goals of counterexam?
 ple philosophy. Philosophers might set them?
 selves the goal of providing an account of
 metaphysical reality. So (K) succeeds just in
 case it tells us what knowledge really is. Will
 the proponent of metaphysical counterex?
 ample philosophy offer an account of how
 we can know when we have found metaphys?
 ical reality? If not, then counterexample phi?
 losophy is futile since we cannot know when
 it succeeds. But suppose he does offer such
 an account. If part of the test for determining
 whether we have found metaphysical reality
 involves checking whether the extension of the
 target term has been preserved, at least in the
 clear cases, then metaphysical counterexam?
 ple philosophy will fall victim to the argument
 against conceptual explication in section III. If
 metaphysical counterexample philosophy
 does not involve preserving the extension of
 the target term, then it faces the challenge
 faced by conceptual revision discussed above
 and in section IV. So for the purposes of this
 paper, metaphysical counterexample philoso?
 phy can be seen as either futile, an instance of
 explication, or an instance of revision.
 II. The FUTILITY OF
 Conceptual Analysis
 Classical conceptual analysis aims to de?
 scribe the structure of a philosophically im?
 portant concept in terms of singly necessary
 and jointly sufficient conditions. This en?
 deavor is doomed because most concepts are
 not structured classically. This is not news to
 philosophers. Since Wittgenstein (1953),
 philosophers have argued that there are no
 classical conditions for the application of our
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 terms. But even ifvte assume that philosoph?
 ically important concepts are represented
 classically, it does not follow that counterex?
 ample philosophy as currently practiced is a
 reasonable method to use to discover the
 structure of our concepts. Questions about
 the actual structure of our concepts are in
 principle as empirical as questions about the
 actual structure of iron. No one would seri?
 ously propose studying the structure of iron
 by engaging in counterexample philosophy.
 But one might suppose that counterexample
 philosophy plays an important supplemen?
 tary role in the empirical study of our concepts.
 (For a necessarily abbreviated description of
 such studies, see the Appendix.)
 Philosophical reflections on the nature of
 mental representation have influenced and
 should continue to influence the empirical
 study of concepts. But what can classical
 counterexample philosophy contribute to
 the empirical endeavor that cannot be at?
 tained more efficiently by psychologists? It
 has nothing to contribute about what con?
 cept Cs structure might be (everyone knows
 it might be classical) or about what empirical
 methods to employ in finding out about Cs
 structure. And considering the data psychol?
 ogists take to be relevant to determining Cs
 structure?which features subjects take to
 be defining, categorization times, typicality
 judgements, etc.?counterexample philoso?
 phy offers no evidence that psychologists
 can't readily discover on their own.
 There is one situation in which counterex?
 ample philosophy could prove useful. It
 could be used to discover Cs defining fea?
 tures when subjects are incapable of listing
 them, which could well happen with philo?
 sophically important terms. Two problems
 arise with this suggestion. First, until subjects
 fail to list defining features for a concept,
 there is no reason for the psychologist to en?
 gage in counterexample philosophy. So phi?
 losophers attempting to supplement
 psychology are jumping the gun. Second,
 and more importantly, since there is no a pri?
 ori reason to assume that C is represented
 classically, there is no reason to search for
 classical conditions for the application of C
 Thus, even when subjects can't deliver Cs
 defining features, classical counterexample
 philosophy is not the method that ought to
 be employed in finding those features.
 Nicholas Rescher (1973, 1985) has ad?
 vanced another argument to the conclusion
 that even if concepts are classically struc?
 tured, conceptual analysis as practiced can?
 not succeed. Philosophically pivotal
 concepts, like most of our concepts, are "at?
 tuned to our practical dealings in a complex
 world where some degree of oversimplifica?
 tion is always necessary in the interests of
 manageability" (1985, p. 56). As a result, the
 set of criteria associated with such concepts
 inevitably reflect contingent assumptions
 (they are "fact coordinated"). For example,
 the concept of personal identity "unites a plu?
 rality of factors, among which bodily continu?
 ity and sameness of personality are the
 outstanding members. These factors are held
 together in a harmonious symbiosis by factual
 considerations" (1985, p. 50). As long as those
 assumptions are stable, the concept can be a
 productive unit of thought. But if those as?
 sumptions are sabotaged, paradox inevitably
 ensues. And those assumptions are constantly
 sabotaged when philosophers attempt to apply
 their analyses to very different possible worlds.
 When philosophers draw modal conclusions
 from their analyses or propose counterex?
 amples that hold only in very distant possible
 worlds, they are undermining the conditions
 of the concept's effectiveness. Even if a con?
 cept is structured classically, its domain of
 effectiveness is limited to normal cases, and
 so applying its criteria to certain types of
 cleverly constructed cases will result in the
 sorts of paradoxes and counterexamples that
 pervade the philosophical literature.
 Counterexample philosophy in the service
 of conceptual analysis is a futile endeavor. If
 philosophically important concepts are rep?
 resented classically, counterexample philos?
 ophy as actually practiced is an irrational
 means of achieving the goal of conceptual
 analysis. And if they are not represented
 classically, the endeavor cannot succeed.
 III. The Possibility of
 Conceptual Explication
 Let's assume that the psychological litera?
 ture is correct and our judgements about
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 whether a philosophically important term
 applies in actual and counterfactual situa?
 tions are fixed by non-classical descriptions.2
 It is unlikely that we can find a non-circular
 classical explication of our terms.3 To see
 why, consider the situation. We begin with a
 set of objects and a language that has a fixed
 number of legitimate predicates. The exten?
 sion of a predicate is a set of objects. The
 target term, P, is defined by some disjunction
 of predicates, Al-An. The extension of P is
 the union of the extensions of Al-An. What
 is the likelihood that there is a conjunction of
 predicates, Bl-Bn, that is coextensive with
 P? At a purely intuitive level, it seems un?
 likely that there will be some set of predi?
 cates with extensions whose intersection is
 coextensive with P (the union of Al-An).
 To cash out the intuition, consider what
 factors would tend to affect the likelihood of
 successfully explicating the empirical predi?
 cate, P. Here's one: All things being equal, it
 is more likely that we can find a classical
 explication for P insofar as the extension of P
 is smaller. The argument for this principle
 rests on two premises.
 (1) Other things being equal, a smaller
 number of objects will fall within the exten?
 sion of more empirical predicates of the lan?
 guage than a larger number of objects.
 For example, the set of crows falls within
 the extension of more English predicates
 than the set of birds. This premise applies to
 empirical terms, but not to mathematical
 terms?they can be given classical explica?
 tions even though they have infinite exten?
 sions. This paper assumes that the terms
 philosophers analyze apply to states of af?
 fairs that do not have the well-ordered struc?
 ture of mathematics. So insofar as (1) is
 concerned, the terms philosophers analyze
 are more like empirical terms than mathe?
 matical ones. And surely the burden of proof
 rests on anyone claiming the opposite. The
 second premise is as follows.
 (2) Other things being equal, the more sin?
 gly necessary conditions a set of objects
 share, the more likely it is that some set of
 those conditions will be jointly sufficient.4
 Given these premises, the probability of
 successfully explicating P is inversely related
 to the number of objects in its extension. As
 we have seen, philosophical explications are
 meant to range over all logically possible
 worlds. Therefore, the chances of conceptual
 explication succeeding appears very low. But
 this conclusion comes too fast. There are
 other factors that affect the probability of
 success in conceptual explication, and some
 of these might counteract the extension effect.
 We have indirect evidence suggesting there is
 no countervailing factor: Philosophers since
 Plato have failed to propose a classical explica?
 tion of a philosophically important term that is
 today considered successful. So we may legiti?
 mately conclude that all of the evidence avail?
 able to us about the situation facing those
 engaged in classical explication indicates
 that it is very likely to fail.
 IV. Conceptual Revision
 If the attempt to offer accounts of philo?
 sophically important concepts that preserve
 the original term's extension is futile, then
 what becomes of philosophy? Should we be?
 queath the attempt to analyze and under?
 stand our concepts to empirical psychology?
 Perhaps. But before doing this, let's consider
 the option of conceptual revision. The
 revisionist does not set for herself the goal of
 preserving the extension of a term as it is
 used by a group of speakers. But then, what
 makes one potential revision preferable to
 another? One plausible variety of concep?
 tual revision involves the principle of theoret?
 ical excellence: Adopt the successor concept
 that is part of the best available empirical
 theory. The 'best available empirical theory'
 is the one that possesses the greatest combi?
 nation of theoretical virtues (such as explan?
 atory and predictive power, accuracy,
 simplicity, scope).
 The motives behind the adoption of this
 principle are the same ones we have for ac?
 cepting the best available scientific theories.
 Although there is controversy on this point,
 there are two reasons to adopt the aim of
 conceptual revision in the service of theoret?
 ical excellence. First, the best available theo?
 ries usually provide pragmatic benefits over
 less adequate theories?individuals and so?
 cieties tend to be more efficient in achieving
 their goals and meeting their needs as their
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 theories become more pragmatically power?
 ful. Second, one is more likely to have true
 beliefs if one adopts the best available the?
 ory.5 So if the extension of a successor con?
 cept is reasonably similar to that of the target
 concept, and the successor plays a role in a
 theory that provides more pragmatic and ep
 istemic benefits than any alternative, then it
 is reasonable to adopt it as a revision of the
 target concept. Is conceptual revision in the
 service of theoretical excellence an achiev?
 able goal? At least in some cases, there is
 reason to think it is.
 IV.i. Science: The Future of Philosophy?
 Bertrand Russell believed that many phil?
 osophical issues spun off from philosophy as
 soon as they became well understood. This
 characteristic centrifugal force accounts in
 part for the uncertainty of philosophy.
 [A]s soon as definite knowledge concerning
 any subject becomes possible, this subject
 ceases to be called philosophy, and becomes a
 separate science. The whole study of the heav?
 ens, which now belongs to astronomy, was once
 included in philosophy; Newton's great work
 was called "the mathematical principles of nat?
 ural philosophy"... Thus, to a great extent, the
 uncertainty of philosophy is more apparent
 than real: those questions which are already
 capable of definite answers are placed in the
 sciences, while those only to which, at present,
 no definite answer can be given, remain to
 form the residue which is called philosophy
 (1959, p. 155).
 Science contains numerous well-defined
 concepts and even some classical ones. Of
 course, many scientific concepts have no
 strictly defined conditions of application and
 yet are used to good effect. This is especially
 so in the "higher-level" sciences like biology;
 psychology and the social sciences. Whether
 this conceptual fuzziness is a permanent or
 essential feature of these sciences a very
 hard and tricky issue. Nevertheless, the his?
 tory of science gives us some reason to be?
 lieve that as a science matures, the concepts
 it employs become clearer.
 Chemistry is an example of a science that
 contains many classical and well-defined
 concepts. Some of these (e.g., atom and
 water) have been the object of considerable
 philosophical contemplation. If we look
 closely at how such terms are treated by sci?
 ence, however, we quickly realize that the
 concepts and their extensions have been rad?
 ically revised. Consider the term "gold."
 Chemical theory identifies gold as the stuff
 with a particular chemical structure, while
 most people are disposed to apply "gold" to
 things that satisfy descriptions like "x is yel?
 lowish, x is valuable, * is a metal..." If this is
 right, it is easy to develop counterexamples
 to the chemical account of the term "gold"?
 counterexamples that show that the exten?
 sion of the chemical concept differs from the
 extension of our commonsense concept. For
 example, suppose that in some possible
 world the element with atomic number 79
 were a purple, viscous liquid. Many would
 not be disposed to apply the term "gold" to
 this purple goo. Suppose also that in this pos?
 sible world, there is a metal that has all the
 aesthetic and economic properties gold has
 in the actual world, but its atomic number
 isn't 79. Many people would be disposed to
 apply the term "gold" to this. The accounts
 of concepts given by scientific theories are
 often revisions, sometimes radical revisions,
 of the concepts we actually employ and their
 extensions across possible worlds.6
 One might argue that the chemical ac?
 count is not really a revision since the exten?
 sion of "gold" has always been the stuff with
 atomic number 79, regardless of how people
 are disposed to apply the term in counterfac
 tual situations. Whether or not this account of
 the extension of natural kind terms is correct,
 the chemical account is revisionary in the fol?
 lowing sense: It is not the account that would be
 acceptable to those engaged in counterexample
 philosophy before they had adopted chemical
 theory. For them, the sole test for the acceptabil?
 ity of a proposed account of the term "gold" is
 how they are disposed to apply it in counterfac
 tual situations. Insofar as we are interested in
 the product of counterexample philosophy, it
 is legitimate to say that the chemical account of
 "gold" is revisionary.
 Suppose a concept which is deemed to be
 philosophically important today, will be ap?
 propriated by scientists when that concept is
 fit for empirical study. One way philosophers
 can succeed in classically revising their con
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 cepts is to ready them for appropriation. Sci?
 entists will find a concept useful when it fits
 into a promising empirical theory. Therefore,
 one way philosophers can succeed in classi?
 cally revising, or at least clarifying, their con?
 cepts is by attempting to fit them into
 empirical theories. It is unquestionably
 perverse to suggest that philosophers can
 succeed in classically revising their con?
 cepts by handing them over to scientists.
 But the world is sometimes perverse. Fur?
 ther, if Russell is correct, philosophers
 have no choice in the matter: part of their
 raison d'etre is to bequeath useful concepts
 to science.
 This sort of conceptual transfer is a real
 possibility in the philosophy of science. Con?
 cepts that have been of particular concern in
 this arena, such as scientific theory, explana?
 tion, confirmation, pseudo-science, etc., may
 (or may not) eventually play a role in empir?
 ical attempts to understand the process of
 science. From what we've seen, it is unlikely
 that we will ever find classical accounts of
 these terms that will also preserve their cur?
 rent extensions. But if similar successor con?
 cepts play a role in the history, sociology, or
 psychology of science, there is at least some
 hope that some day they will be defined
 clearly or perhaps even classically.
 IV.ii. When Science is not the Goal
 In an earlier passage, Russell claimed that
 when an area of philosophy becomes under?
 stood, it spins off to form a science. He has
 more to say on this subject.
 This is, however, only part of the truth concern?
 ing the uncertainty of philosophy. There are
 many questions?and among them those that
 are of the profoundest interest to our spiritual
 life?which, so far as we can see, must remain
 insoluble to the human intellect unless its pow?
 ers become of quite a different order from
 what they are now... Yet, however slight may
 be the hope of discovering an answer, it is part
 of the business of philosophy to continue the
 consideration of such questions, to make us
 aware of their importance, to examine all the
 approaches to them, and to keep alive that
 speculative interest in the universe which is apt
 to be killed by confining ourselves to definitely
 ascertainable knowledge (1959, p. 155-6).
 Philosophers have long been concerned with
 critical issues that appear to have no place in
 empirical or explanatory theories. These
 concepts are not amenable to conceptual re?
 vision in the service of theoretical excel?
 lence. It makes no sense to adopt that
 revision which plays a role in the best avail?
 able empirical theory if the original has no
 role whatsoever to play in such a theory.
 What should we conclude about the possi?
 bility of clarifying philosophically important
 concepts that play no role in empirical theo?
 ries? Given the best psychological data avail?
 able, we probably cannot find a classical
 account of such concepts that preserve their
 intensions or extensions. So we have a
 choice. We can leave to empirical psychology
 the attempt to plumb the structure of these
 concepts or we can embrace conceptual revi?
 sion. But again we face the problem of what
 makes one revision better than another. The
 proper solution is essentially the same as be?
 fore: Adopt that revision that plays a role in
 the best available non-empirical theory on
 the subject. Given that philosophers are
 often not concerned with definitely ascer?
 tainable knowledge, we need not insist that
 the best theories available about some sub?
 ject must be scientific theories.
 Does a revisionary counterexample phi?
 losophy that seeks non-empirical theoretical
 excellence have some possibility of success?
 In science, the attempt to construct inte?
 grated, coherent theories over time tends to
 produce well-defined, and sometimes classi?
 cal, concepts. Perhaps the same results can be
 achieved in philosophy if the same method?
 theory construction?is employed. This argu?
 ment from analogy is by no means apodictic.
 Nor should we expect it to be since philosophy
 seldom offers guarantees of success. But at
 least the empirical evidence does not doom
 this revisionary endeavor (unlike its more con?
 servative counterparts).
 How are philosophers supposed to pro?
 ceed in constructing non-empirical philo?
 sophical theories? John Rawls offers some
 clear advice concerning theories of justice.
 I wish to stress that a theory of justice is pre?
 cisely that, namely, a theory. It is a theory of the
 moral sentiments (to recall an eighteenth cen
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 tury title) setting out the principles governing
 our moral powers, or, more specifically, our
 sense of justice. There is a definite if limited
 class of facts against which conjectured princi?
 ples can be checked, namely, our considered
 judgments in reflective equilibrium. A theory
 of justice is subject to the same rules of method
 as other theories. Definitions and analyses of
 meaning do not have a special place: definition
 is but one device used in setting up the general
 structure of theory. Once the whole framework
 is worked out, definitions have no distinct sta?
 tus and stand or fall with the theory itself... This
 is the conception of the subject adopted by
 most classical British writers through Sidgwick.
 I see no reason to depart from it. [In a footnote]
 I believe this view goes back in its essentials to
 Aristotle's procedure in the Nicomachean Eth?
 ics (1971, p. 50-1).
 We can identify three conditions that should
 be met by anyone proposing to clarify philo?
 sophically important concepts that appear to
 have no role to play in empirical theories.
 First, the philosopher needs to identify the
 phenomena to be accounted for by the the?
 ory. In the course of theory construction, his
 conception of what the theory should ac?
 count for might change. But at any time, he
 should be clear about his object of study. Sec?
 ond, the philosopher should attempt to pro?
 vide some sort of explanatory or theoretical
 structure to account for the relevant phe?
 nomena. Definitions are helpful only inso?
 far as they aid in the production or in the
 understanding of a theory, but they are not
 the primary aim of the enterprise. And
 third, theory-choice should be governed by
 the same sorts of normative principles as are
 empirical theories. Much more needs to be
 said about the nature of non-empirical theory
 construction in philosophy. But these three
 conditions are important because they can be
 (and have been) so readily overlooked in the
 philosophical attempt to clarify our concepts.
 IV.iii. Counterexample Philosophy and
 Conceptual Revision
 Counterexample philosophy is particu?
 larly efficient at exposing the ways in which
 the extensions of two concepts differ. How?
 ever, if we want to produce a revision of an
 old concept, what role, if any, does counter
 example philosophy have to play? It retains
 an important role. Engaging in conceptual
 revision does not guarantee freedom from
 counterexamples. In order for a counterex?
 ample to succeed against a revision, how?
 ever, it can't merely show that the new
 concept has a different extension from the
 original. It must show that the revised con?
 cept fails to perform its appointed role
 within the theory in which it is embedded.
 The trick to engaging in revisionary counter?
 example philosophy is to begin by under?
 standing the relevant theory and the role the
 target concept is supposed to play in that the?
 ory. In this way, we learn to properly employ
 that concept. Once we have grasped the new
 concept, it is possible to proceed exactly as if
 we were engaged in conceptual explication.
 That is, we check the extension of the pro?
 posed account against the extension of the new
 concept as we understand it. The only differ?
 ence between conceptual explication and con?
 ceptual revision is that the latter doesn't
 explicate a concept already in use. It explicates
 a concept that is part of a developing theory.
 (In at least some cases, it is likely that the theory
 itself will provide the classical conditions for the
 application of the term. For example, chemical
 theory provides the resources for a classical ac?
 count of the term "water.")
 V Final Words
 This paper has been concerned with the
 philosophical attempt to analyze and clarify
 philosophically important concepts. The
 general moral to draw is that this philosoph?
 ical endeavor, and probably lots of others,
 are hostage to empirical facts. Without the
 assumption that concepts are represented
 classically, classical accounts that aim to pre?
 serve the intension or extension of a term
 don't make a whole lot of sense. A second
 conclusion to draw is that if we want counter?
 example philosophy to succeed, we need to
 alter its character by making it more natural?
 istic. This involves viewing it as either part of
 an attempt to construct an empirical theory
 or as part of an attempt to construct a non
 empirical theory that is subject to some of
 the same demands as empirical theories. In
 particular, it should have a reasonably well
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 defined range of data it is supposed to ac?
 count for, it should provide some sort of ex?
 planatory structure for that data, and it
 should be subject to the same sorts of norma?
 tive principles as are empirical theories.
 Making counterexample philosophy more
 naturalistic both increases the probability of
 finding a classical account of a concept and
 carries with it the benefits associated with
 adopting a successful theory.7
 Iowa State University
 Received October 28,1991
 Appendix: The Psychological Data
 Over the past twenty years or so, psychologists have adduced considerable evidence for thinking
 that concepts are not structured in terms of singly necessary and jointly sufficient conditions.
 Psychologists studying the structure of our concepts hope to understand the cognitive structure and
 processing of natural language. They construct cognitive models of concepts that are faithful to
 data about the ways in which we employ our concepts, primarily in categorization tasks. Most of
 these models assume that a concept is instantiated as an interpretable syntactic string (or a set of
 such strings). It is natural and conventional to call these interpreted syntactic strings descriptions.
 The classical view of concepts (which is reminiscent of the classical description theory of terms)
 says that the descriptions that constitute concept C provide singly necessary and jointly sufficient
 conditions for the application of C. So in order for an object O to be an instance of C, O must satisfy
 all the descriptions that constitute C.
 In order to make behavioral predictions about how concepts are actually employed, we need
 more than just an account of their structure. We need a model of our concepts that describes the
 cognitive mechanisms subserving particular tasks, such as categorization. Consider the following
 (simple and incomplete) classical model of concepts.
 (I) Concepts consist of sets of descriptions that are singly necessary and jointly sufficient for the
 application of the concept.
 (II) If C2 is a superordinate of C\, then the descriptions that constitute C2 also constitute Q.
 (III) Categorization works as follows: The comparator takes each description that constitutes C2
 (the alleged superordinate, say, bird) and searches Q (the alleged subordinate, say, robin) for
 a match. If all of C2's descriptions are matched, then Q is categorized as a C2. If, however,
 any of C2's descriptions do not match one of C{s descriptions, then C\ is not a C2.
 (IV) The time it takes to complete the matching process is an increasing function of the number
 of description-description matches that are attempted.
 (I) is the heart of the classical model. To give it up is to give up the assumption that concepts are
 structured classically. (II)?(IV) describe the mechanisms subserving categorization. They explain
 how a subject decides that a robin is a bird, or that a grasshopper is not a fish, or that the belief that
 the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket is (or is not) knowledge.
 The problem with the classical view of concepts is that no motivated classical model has been
 constructed that can account for typicality effects while competing models account for them quite
 well (for a survey, see Smith and Medin, 1981). Consider the first piece of evidence marshalled
 against the classical view.
 (1) Non-necessary features listed as defining: When subjects are asked to give descriptions of the
 defining features of a category, they often list non-necessary features (Hampton, 1979). For
 example, when given the category vehicle, most subjects offered the non-necessary feature "has
 wheels" as a defining feature (counterexamples: boats, sleds).
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 The fact that subjects list non-necessary features as defining is not by itself telling evidence
 against the classical view. It is possible that subjects report features typically associated with
 vehicles that are not constitutive of their concept vehicle.
 (2) Determinant of Typicality: Q tends to be ranked as more typical of C2 to the extent C\ shares
 defining features with C2. For example, robin will be ranked as a more typical bird than (say)
 chicken because it shares more defining features with bird than does chicken (including the
 particularly important feature, "flies") (Rosch and Mervis 1975; Hampton 1979).
 Again, this need not shake the faith of the defender of the classical model. The model is silent on
 how typicality judgements are made. (Ideally, of course, a classical model will eventually be able to
 explain them.)
 (3) Typicality Effect: If C\ is more typical than C{ of C2, then Q will be categorized faster than C{
 as an instance of C2. So robin will be categorized faster than chicken as an instance of bird (Rosch,
 1973; Hampton, 1979).
 Given the classical model, why do subjects categorize robin faster than chicken as an instance of
 bird? Presumably something about the concept chicken makes it harder to categorize than robin.
 Perhaps the descriptions that constitute the concept chicken are harder to retrieve. Or perhaps it
 consists of more descriptions than does the concept robin. After all, the classical model implies that
 when a subject is asked whether a Cx is a C2, assuming the answer is "Yes," categorization time will
 be an increasing function of the number of description-description matchings that must be carried
 out. Given the data adduced in 1?3, the classical model is not yet in danger.
 (4) Typicality Effects?A Function of the Superordinate: Whether C\ is categorized faster than C\ 'as
 an instance of C2 depends on C2. For example, while robin is categorized faster than chicken as
 an instance of bird, chicken is categorized faster than robin as an instance of animal (Smith and
 Medin, p. 51-3).
 Now the classical model is in trouble. Categorization times are a function of the superordinate
 concept involved, not the subordinate concepts. Assuming that there is something about the con?
 cept chicken that makes it harder to categorize than robin flies in the face of the fact that chicken is
 categorized faster than robin as an instance of animal. How then to account for the typicality effects
 on the classical view of concepts?
 The simple classical model also has problems with nested concepts. A trio of concepts are nested
 when C2 is a superordinate of Cl5 and C3 is a superordinate of C2. For example, the trio robin-bird
 animal are nested. The classical model predicts that C? will be categorized faster as a C3 than as a
 C2, and this is false for most cases (Smith & Medin, 1981).
 Of course, it is possible to tinker with the simple model so it does not succumb to these problems.
 For instance, by giving up (II), we might be able to save the classical assumption and avoid the
 problems that arise with the typicality effects. However, giving up (II) makes it very difficult to
 explain how categorization might work. How can C1 be categorized as an instance of C2 if C1 does
 not consist of all the descriptions that are necessary and sufficient for the application of C2? No
 classical models yet proposed seem capable of accounting for the above categorization phenomena.
 The failure of classical models is compounded by the fact that alternative models do a much better job
 handling the available evidence. Consider a probabilistic model of concepts (which is reminiscent of the
 cluster theory of names [Wittgenstein, 1953; Searle, 1958]): Concepts consist of a set of descriptions that
 need not be individually necessary for the application of the concept. Each description is given a weight,
 which is a measure of the subjective probability that instances of the concept will possess the property
 described. Categorization is (again) a matching process, but when a match occurs, the matched
 description's weight is added to a running sum. C is categorized as an instance of C1 just in case C
 possesses a critical sum of the weighted features. Behavioral results that proved problematic for the
 classical model are easily explained on the probabilistic model. For example, the typicality effect is the
 result of the critical sum of weighted descriptions being arrived at quickly. Many psychologists believe
 that the probabilistic model is inadequate. For this reason, new models of concepts (particularly
 exemplar or prototype models) have appeared (Smith and Medin, chapter 7).
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 NOTES
 1. Carnap introduced the notion of conceptual explication as follows: One is engaged in conceptual
 explication if one is "making more exact a vague or not quite exact concept used in everyday life or in
 an earlier stage of scientific or logical development, or... replacing it by a newly constructed, more exact
 concept..." (1956, p. 7-8). The account of explication given here assumes that part of what is involved in
 providing a "more exact" concept is providing a classical concept.
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 2. Although it is plausible to assume that intension alone does not always fix extension, the assumption
 that it does is justified in this context because of the nature of counterexample philosophy. When a
 counterexample is given against an account of C, the success of the counterexample depends on whether
 subjects judge it to be an instance or non-instance of C. And these judgments are fixed solely by the
 terms' intensions. So in attempting to understand the practice of counterexample philosophy, it is
 legitimate to assume that intension fixes extension.
 3. Some might argue that the intensions of some terms embody their "real essences." Thus, the intension
 of "water" is given by the description, "the stuff having the same chemical nature as th?s" (Putnam, 1975).
 Therefore, a successful explication will specify that chemical nature. The problem with this suggestion
 is that this cannot be an analysis of how our concepts are actually represented. Since individuals
 confidently apply the term "water" to a liquid without knowing its chemical composition, other
 descriptions (including perhaps the description involving the chemical properties of water) must be
 involved.
 4. One might argue that this factor cuts both ways. Although it may be easier to find necessary conditions
 for a smaller number of objects, it is harder to find sufficient conditions. This objection is irrelevant.
 Given that conceptual explications range over a huge (or an infinite) number of objects, it is easy to find
 sufficient conditions for the application of a concept. However, a successful classical explication will not
 simply provide a disjunctive list of sufficient conditions. It will provide list of necessary conditions that
 are jointly sufficient. And a larger set of objects to account for makes only the former task easier.
 5. Certain antirealists will not be moved by this second motive. For them, the pragmatic motive is
 sufficient to adopt the aim of conceptual revision in the service of theoretical excellence.
 6. One might argue that everyone is disposed to apply "gold" in the counterfactual examples in
 accordance with the chemical account. But this is doubtful. No one would insist upon a chemical account
 of terms like "mud" or "tabasco sauce." Why would we expect the chemically uninitiated to treat the
 mass noun "mud" differently from the mass noun "water"? Ultimately, of course, this is an empirical
 issue and requires empirical investigation.
 7.1 would like to thank Patricia Kitcher, Philip Kitcher, David Magnus, the members of the philosophy
 department at Iowa State University, the editor and an anonymous referee for very helpful comments
 on earlier drafts of this paper. I owe special thanks to Stephen Stich for many discussions and ideas.
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